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JOHN MEYER AND GREGORY INGRAM
Introduction
Almost certainly the outstanding economic event
of 1974 was that combination of problems, con-
sequences, and unusual developments associ-
ated with the phrase "the energy crisis.'It meant
many things to many people. It had many impli-
cations, both short run and long run. In the short
runitconfronted the nation with many new
and unexpected economic problems. To start,
there was the large drop in U.S. real GNP in the
first quarter of 1974; rarely in recent history had
such a sharp decline in economic activity been
so concentrated or less diffused. In addition,
large and uncertain swings occurred in balances
of payments. Some industrialized or developed
countries did better than expected arid some
fared not so well. Several less-developed coun-
tries faced in a new and more startling form their
constant, ever-recurring problem of adequately
clothing and feeding their people. Financial
people everywhere discussed how to "recycle"
the exceptional surges in earnings experienced
by oil-producing countries so as to tide over
those consuming nations experiencing tempo-
rary(or more permanent) foreign exchange
crises, all the while attempting to avoid an out-
break of trade wars or worldwide recession.
Perhaps most surprisingly, for the first time in
two decades or so governments of the indus-
trial West contemplated, or in a few cases even
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implemented, rationing schemes.
The longer-run implications of the energy
crisis perhaps even more fundamental. In
particular, a long and festering dispute both
within and outside the field of economics about
the meaning, validity, and desirability of eco-
nomic growth was brought to the fore. The stage
was also set for a remarkably dramatic test of
the ability of the market mechanism to compen-
sate for supply shortages. Economists had long
been skeptical of apocalyptic forecasts of the
imminent depletion of natural resources. They
believed that scarcity would induce price in-
creases that would in turn induce consumers
and producers to find substitutes for scarce
goods or factors of production long before any
scarcities became a serious problem. Many
physical scientists and engineers, on the other
hand, foresaw the world pursuing fixed produc-
tion and consumption patterns, regardless of
prices and other market signals, into ruinous ex-
haustion and depletion of available resources.
Early experiences with the energy crisis seemed
to provide some sustenance for both viewpoints!
Inevitably, the energy crisis also focused pub-
lic attention on environmental issues and led to
a serious reevaluation of certain recent public
policies inthis area. Specifically, the energy
crisis moved the discussion of environmental
issues into a more sophisticated and maturephase in which previously neglected economic
questions, such as what are the benefits and
costs of these environmental programs, became
acutely sensitive and important.
It would be gratifying to report that National
Bureau research had anticipated all of these
new or suddenly more prominent energy and
environmental issues.It would be even more
gratifying, of course, if such research had pro-
vided a factual basis for the resolution of these
problems. Unfortunately, Bureau research an-
ticipated these new developments dimly at best
and provided only a small bit of the factual
knowledge required to deal with the myriad of
problems that the energy crisis raised.
During the past year, however, we did publish
a first attempt at estimating international capital
flows, thereby providing at least a part of the
factual basis for assessing such problems as the
recycling of oil royalties or determining the di-
mensions of a new international monetary equi-
librium.' We also continued our research on
problems of exchange rate adjustments of less-
developed countries; these studies, hopefully,
should shed some light on the new or additional
complexities of financing economic develop-
ment in the less-developed parts of the world
facing high energy and food costs.2 One could
also argue that the Bureau's ongoing research
on the causes and diagnoses of business cycle
phenomena would help analysts understand the
relatively new phenomenon of a retardation in
economic activity apparently created by supply
shortages, just as such research was pertinent
to previous recessions created by insufficient
demand. As much as one might have wished for
a more complete research program and factual
basis for dealing with the short-run problems of
the energy crisis, these bits and pieces of re-
search were at least relevant and somewhat
helpful.
On. the longer-term issues, essentially involv-
ing the meaning and evaluation of economic
growth, the Bureau had also been at work,
though much was still to be done. The Bureau's
Raymond F.Mikesell and J. Herbert Furth, Foreign
Dollar Balances and the International Role of the Dollar
(New York: NBER, 1974).
2 See the reports by Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne Krueger
in the International Studies section in Part II of this report.
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program dealing with problems of social mea-
surement (or more precisely with how the na-
tional income accounts might be augmented or
extended to better reflect different and more
complex facets of economic development) con-
tinued and began to yield some results.3 Further-
more, as a by-product of the Bureau's program
for modeling urban growth and development
patterns, the Bureau also became involved for
the first time in studies relating to environmental
issues, so inextricably intertwined with those of
energy. Specifically, the Bureau completed dur-
ing the past year some preliminary studies on
the relationship between economic development
and the demand for water used in industrial
processes,4 an investigation that was a quite
natural extension of our ongoing work on indus-
reau's staff became involvedin an advisory
capacity to a committee of the National Academy
of Sciences that in essence had been asked to
determine "what are the benefits and costs of
emissions controls on mobile sources of air
pollution?"
The National Bureau's work in helping this
National Academy Committee inits delibera-
tions is perhaps a particularly apt illustration of
the potential corn plementarity between basic on-
going research at the Bureau and the
of specific policy problems in our society. As
such, and given the timeliness of the subject, it
seems appropriate to devote some particular
attention to a review of our work in this area,
always recognizing that any results reported are
quite tentative and preliminary.
See the progress reports in Part II under Measurement
of Economic and Social Performance.
See the progress report by Robert Leone, J. Royce
Ginn, and An-Ioh Lin in Part II under Urban and Regional
Studies.
The co-authors of this introduction are, respectively,
the chairman and the executive director of the National
Academy of Sciences' committee on the Costs and Bene-









decisions. Similarly, some mem-
Bureau's urban research group
apply their knowledge of urban
problems to understanding the
among atleast the cruder di-
locationpatterns, transportation
the creation of air pollutants in
In particular, several of the Bu-The Clean Air Act of 1970:
A Policy Problem in Need of
Further Research
The Clean Air Act of 1970, as almost everyone
now knows, set very ambitious standards. Partly
because of its innovative goals, the act has also
created a good deal of controversy. Many felt
that the standards set were much too stringent,
particularly those for automotive or mobile emis-
sions. As a result, the policy commitments in
the original 1970 legislation could entail very
heavy costs for American society. Official esti-
mates suggest that $25 to $30 billion will be
needed annually for all environmental programs
for at least the next decade or so. Some even
have suggested that the air quality act alone
could cost $60 billion annually. Even if the $60
billion annual estimate is badly inflated, which it
probably is,it seems difficult to place the costs
of meeting the original air quality standards
much beneath $15 billion annually; and $10 to
$20 billion of annual outlays is not a totally un-
realistic estimate of what might be required to
clean up auto emissions alone.
With such large sums at stake,itis natural
enough to question whether the expenditures
are worthwhile. Unfortunately, we really don't
have the knowledge to answer that question very
precisely. No little uncertainty exists, for exam-
ple, about the costs of reducing vehicular emis-
sions, and the uncertainties about the benefits
produced by reducing emissions are much
greater. The truth is that clean air legislation
constitutes an almost classic example of policy
potentially outrunning knowledge and research.
The best way of quickly grasping the extent of
the imponderables is to look at an overall sche-
matic of what would be involved in doing a bene-
fitcost evaluationof emission controls, as
shown in Figure I-i. In essence, almost every
one of the arrows in Figure I-i connotes a large
area of uncertainty, or an important information
gap.
To start, there are missing elements in our
knowledge about the essentially technological
questions (as denoted by the far-left arrow in
Figure I-i) of how reduced emissions from autos,
factories, and other sources will improve ambi-
ent air quality. The answers to these questions
may seem obvious, but they really are not, For
example, therelation between emissions of
primary pollutants such as hydrocarbons and
oxides of nitrogen and the formation of second-
Figure I-i
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consequencesary pollutants such as photochemical smog can-
not be specified very accurately. Additional
complications are introduced when cures for one
type of emission problem may actually worsen
other types of air pollution. For example, cata-
lytic mufflers, which should permit automobiles
to meet the most stringent emission standards
of the 1970 Clean Air Act, may actually produce
new health problems by increasing automotive
emissions of presently uncontrolled substances.
Specifically, some scientists contend that cer-
tain sulphate particulates may be emitted by the
catalytic mufflers, which in the atmosphere or in
people's lungs could be converted into sul-
furicacid,withseriouseffectson human
health. If we take a broader view of the pollution
problem, we can also observe that some im-
provements in air quality may be "bought" at
the expense of worsening other environmental
problems; for example, low-sulfur fuel may help
reduce air pollution, but it may also complicate
meeting certain water pollution standards.
Similarly, moving to the arrow in the middle of
Figure I-i (mapping improved ambient air quality
on to physical, medical, and biological conse-
quences), we really do not know the extent to
which an improvement in ambient air quality
actually improves health, conserves materials,
reduces structural maintenance, or contributes
to better environmental or recreational enjoy-
ment. The truth is that medical, engineering, and
economic evidence on these points is very in-
complete arid uncertain. For example, epidemi-
ologists have found associations between vari-
ous health effects and sulfate and particulate
pollution,but have found few associations
among health effects and carbon monoxide or
oxides of nitrogen. Simultaneously, many clinical
investigators have found that high short-term
concentrationsof nitrogen oxides and car-
bon monoxide produce marked physiological
changes, whereas short-term exposure to sulfur
oxides produces few responses. Of course,
these findings are not necessarily inconsistent.
Clinicians might be quite right in observing that
short-term exposures to high concentrations of
some pollutants do harmfully affect at least cer-
tain classes of people. On the other hand, epide-
miologists, who work more with broad aggre-
gates,are undoubtedly more successfulat
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identifying chronic health effects associated with
long-term exposure to low concentrations of
pollutants. Needless to say, combining the re-
sults of clinical experiments with epidemiologi-
cal studies to predict the consequences of re-
duced exposure to pollutants is no easy task.
Nevertheless, it is clearly difficult to evaluate, let
alone justify, major air quality improvement pro-
grams without determining the extent of the
physical consequences of improved air quality.
The third, or far-right, arrow in Figure I-i de-
notes a basic set of questions that are essentially
economic in character. Specifically, what is the
value—in dollars and cents if possible—of the
health, material, agricultural, and other improve-
ments attributable to clean air, both in the aggre-
gate and at the margin? In short, if polluted air is
harmful, what isit costing us? Incidentally, the
marginal values are crucial to evaluating differ-
ent air quality standards if the achievement of
these standards are at all costly and these costs
respond other than linearly to revisions in the
standards. Unfortunately, almost no evidence is
available on what these marginal costs and rela-
tionships might be, Rather, what few estimates
we do have about the value of benefits that might
be attributable to cleaner air tend to be ag-
gregates. Thus, the Environmental Protection
Agency's current best guess about these aggre-
gates is on the order of $14 to $16 billion annu-
ally. Some other observers would tend to put the
figures lower, sometimes at an aggregate level
no higher than $4 to $6 billion annually. Obvi-
ously, quite a range separates the higher from
the lower of these estimates.
In addition to these quite basic questions
about benefits, we also should know what it
would cost to implement alternative policies for
reducing emissions. In terms of Figure I-i, such
studies could be characterized as cost-effective-
ness analyses for achieving or implementing the
various policy actions shown in the three left-
hand boxes; that is, for reducing emissions from
stationary sources, reducing automotive emis-
sion rates, and implementing transportation con-
trol policies to reduce emissions. These cost
effectiveness questions are involved,butin
many respects they are not quite so difficult as
the basic health and benefit evaluation questions
just described. Nevertheless, as pointed out inthe next section, they do require quite complex
systems analyses. One might add that these
analyses are only beginning to be understood,
let alone done.
The Cost Effectiveness of
Transportation Control Policies for
Achievi.ng Clean Air in Boston: An
Illustrative and Preliminary Analysis
The minimal components of a
lytic" model for evaluating the effectiveness of
different urban transportation control policies in
achieving cleaner air in an urban area are as
shown in Figure 1-2. At least three different in-
gredients are required: (1) a transportation sub-
model that indicates how people respond in their
urban transportation choices to different incen-
tives and basic environmental circumstances;
(2) an air emissions submodel that indicates how
different transportation choices translate into
emissions of different pollutants; and (3) a diffu-
sion submodel that transforms the emissions of
different pollutants into pollutant concentrations
over the urban area being analyzed, allowing not
on'y for different kinds of emissions but also for
meteorological and other factors that might be
expected to influence the diffusion of pollutants.
To provide a systems analytic capability for
our National Academy Study, we built on previ-
ous effortsin developing these various sub-
models and linking them together. Thus, our
transportation submodel embodies a standard
urban transportation planning model adapted to
a system of large zones with a special treatment
of transit mode choice. The emissions submodel
incorporates speed-emission relations, deterio-
ration factors, and emission rates compiled by
the Environmental Protection Agency. The dif-
fusion submodel combines simplediffusion
models developed by meteorologists. These
submodels had been integrated into a unified
transportation and air shed simulation model in
previous studies (undertaken in other connec-
tions by Bureau staff members helping with the
National Academy task).6
The simulation model, named TASSIM, was developed
under an NSF-RANN grant and further documented for
the U.S. Dept. of Transportation. See Gregory K. Ingram,
"Simulating the Urban Air Pollution Environment," chap. 5
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It is in the context of such a combination trans-
port and air shed simulation model that trans-
portation control and other non-auto transpor-
tation policies for improving ambient air must be
evaluated. Interest in these other transportation
solutions is essentially twofold. First, there is the
hope or expectation that such solutions might be
less costly to implement than those aimed di-
rectly at reducing automotive emission rates.
Second, other transportation solutions could be
a necessary supplement to reduced automotive
emission rates. Thus, for some American cities
theEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyhas
adopted a positionthat other transportation
solutions will have to be implemented in addition
toreducing automobile emissionsifproper
standards of ambient airquality are to be
achieved.
Transportation controls and other transporta-
tion solutions can take several forms. For in-
stance, typical transit-oriented solutions that
have been include (1) expanding or
creating rail transit systems to wean people from
commuting by auto; (2) making transit relatively
more attractive by instituting express bus serv-
ices that would move on specially reserved, Un-
congested highway lanes; (3) lowering transit
fares in order to provide an economic incentive
for commuters to shift from autos to transit; or
(4) creating more private transit in the form of
jitneys or car pools, or otherwise increasing auto
occupancy levels in urban travel.
Traffic restriction schemes are another broad
group of transportation control policies. Among
the many possibilities in this classification would
be (1) surcharges for central parking, particu-
larly all-day commuter parking, so as to provide
an incentive for people to switch from auto to
transit;(2) imposing special license fees for
gainingaccesstocentralbusinessareas;
(3) outright prohibition of auto access to central
urban areas; (4) restrictions on auto speeds in
urban areas (hopefully enforced!) so as to re-
duce gas consumption and make transit more
in The Automobile and the Regulation ol its Impact on the
Environment,FinalReport, Grant NSF-Gl-29965(forth-
coming); or Gregory K. Ingram and Gary Fauth, TASSIM:
ATransportationandAirShedSimulationModel,
VoIs. 1 and 2, Final Report, Contract DOT-OS-30099, May
1974.attractive; or (5) metering access to urban ex-
pressway or freeway facilities so as to reduce
the traffic congestion on such facilities during
the rush hours, thereby reducing high-pollution
stop-and-go travel.
Land use policies also have been advanced
as a means of improving the ambient air quality
in urban areas, policies sometimes strikingly
varied and often contradictory. Some entail that
employment and residences in urban areas be
centralized, or concentrated, so as to encourage
more transit use and walking, thereby reducing
the pollutants emitted from mobile sources of
urban transportation. Others would continue the
decentralization of employment and residences
so as to reduce peak activity and pollution con-
centrations in urban areas and Inparticular to
reduce exposures to pollution levels considered
unsafe to health.
A number of other, less expensive automotive
strategies for achieving clean air might also be
suggested, strategies that go beyond simply
reducing the emission rates of present standard-
sizedAmericanautomobiles.For example,
smaller cars might be substituted. Smaller cars
not only consume less gasoline but they should
also reduce the costs of achieving certain speci-
fied levels of emissions standards. The National
Academy of Sciences' Committee on Motor Ve-
hicle Emissions has estimated that if compacts
or subcompacts in the 2,000- to 3,000-pound
range were used insteadof standard-sized
American cars of 4,000 pounds or so, annual
costs of achieving automotive emission control
standards could be reduced by $100 to $150 per
vehicle.7
Several of the transportation control and other
transportation policies just described have been
investigated by applying a systems analysis of
the type outlined in Figure 1-2 to the Boston area.
Figure 1-3 displays two levels of effectiveness,
one local and one regional, that correspond to
several of the candidate transportation policies.
The local measure is essentially the predicted
percentage reduction in carbon monoxide con-
centrations in central Boston. The regional mea-
sure, somewhat more sophisticated, is an at-
Report by the Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions,
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., Febru-
ary 1973, esp. Table 5-4, p. 101.
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tempt to measure the millions of person-times of
exposure to pollutant levels exceeding minimal
health standards across the entire Boston metro-
politan region.
Some suggestive inferences can be drawn
from the Boston experience, always remember-
ing that that experience may not generalize to
all American urban areas or situations. First, cer-
tain of the transportation control policies clearly
are not very effective in reducing harmful air
emissions from mobile sources. Indeed, some
may even prove harmful. For example, almost
anything that increases auto speeds, especially
in central urban areas, seems to do rather more
harm than good; apparently, improvements in
auto speeds, if the transport travel forecasting
devices embedded in the transportation model
are correct, induce sufficient new traffic so that
any reductionin the totalpollution per mile
traveled is more than offset by increases in miles
traveled. Similarly, transit extensions (as repre-
sented in this case by those currently planned by
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
ity's master plan), are predicted to have almost
no effect in terms of reducing downtown con-
centrations of carbon monoxide and actually to
have some harmful effects by the regional effec-
Figure 1-2
Major Components of a Transport
and Air Shed Simulation Model
TRANSPORTATION SIJBMODEL
F.orecast distributions of transportation activity
(trips and speeds) in each zone by mode and
purpose of trip.
EMISSION SUBMODEL
Derive area source emissions from automobile
travel using speed/emission factors. Input
stationary area source emissions by zone and
large point source emissions by location.
DIFFUSION SUBMODEL
Generate pollution concentrations in each zone
based on emissions and meteorological factors.Local effectiveness
(per cent CO reduction in Boston Proper)
80
-'A
2,7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 11
Regional effectiveness (million of exposure*)
*To ambient levels exceeding "minimal" standards.
tiveness measure. Likewise, a centralization of
activities, which in this case was tested by relo-
cating to central areas 20 per cent of suburban
residences and work places, is predicted to have
a generally deleterious effect,particularlyin
terms of the regional standard.
The other striking result is how effective the
automotive emissioncontrolsare predicted
to be. The improvement, incidentally,in the
achievement of the auto emissions standards
after differing years of implementation is essen-
tially due to the fact that a typical American auto-
mobile lasts about ten years, so that the total
percentage of the active automobile fleet with
reduced emissions increases as the number of
years of higher standards for new carsin-
creases.If the Boston results are indicative,
achieving ambient air quality standards will re-
quire a significant reduction in automobile emis-
sions.
It is perhaps ironic that the two "other trans-
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portation" strategies that seem to be most prom-
ising—CBD prohibition on auto use and local
licenses for central use of automobiles—may
also rank as the politically most difficult to imple-
ment. On the other hand, a policy of decentrali-
zation (which in this case was a mirror image of
the centralization policy, or, a 20 per cent reduc-
tion in central residential and work place densi-
ties) is something that seems to be happening
without particular policy incentives and does
seem to be helpful in reducing harmful emission
exposures.
The results shown in Figure 1-3 are, of course,
totally devoid of any cost considerations. Toward
calibrating these "other transportation" policies
against their cost, some crude estimates were
made of what each policy might cost to imple-
ment in the Bos,,ton region. It should be stressed
that these cost estimates are first approxima-
tions at best, although probably correct hier-
archically if not in absolute terms. These cost
Figure 1-3
Local and Regional Effectiveness of Various Transport Policies
for Reducing Air Emissions in the Boston Region
Auto emission standards




50 — I Auto emission standards
• after two years of implementation
40-
I • CBD prohibition on auto use
30 —
I • Local license for central use of autos
20 — I •Decentralize
• Reduce transit travel times
10
—
•Decrease central auto speeds
•Decrease all auto speeds
• Raise auto occupancy (e.g., by car pools)
o —
• Increase auto speeds i Boston —1970
• Centralize
—10 — S Increase central auto speeds
I I I I I I IIi I I I I Iestimates are plotted against regional effective-
ness in Figure 1-4 and local effectiveness in Fig-
ure 1-5. (In both figures 1-4 and 1-5 decentraliza-
tion is shown as a zero-cost policy on the ground
that this is something that might occur over sev-
eral years without any specific policy actions or
inducements.) The high costs of implementing
the auto standards (these costs augment rapidly
with years of implementation) coupled with the
basically high achievement levels of these poli-
cies suggest that in air clean-ups, as in most
things, "you get what you pay for." The small-
car, large-car comparisons, incidentally, repre-
sent rough estimates of what the total annual
savings might be in the Boston area by modify-
ing the present (end of 1973) mix of large and
small cars with a mix of automobiles in which
small cars only were added to the fleet after the
new and stricter automotive emissions standards
are implemented. In short, the small-car cost
estimates shown in Figures 1-4 and 1-5 would be
those that one might expect if no more large cars
were added to the Boston fleet if and when strict
emissions standards are actually enforced.
"Other transportation" solutions are clearly
not overwhelmingly effective, at least as com-
pared with actually cleaning up automotive emis-
sions. Nevertheless, they should perhaps not be
dismissed too quickly. These policies do help
somewhat in cleaning up the air and they are
not overwhelmingly expensive. Nevertheless, a
strong suggestion emerges that a reasonably
thorough improvement in urban air quality will
require a significant reductionin automotive
emission rates, and that this in turn will require a
fairly substantial expenditure of funds.
Conclusion
It should be stressed that the results embodied
in the figures of this presentation are necessarily
very crude and approximate. Furthermore, even
if the cost estimates and analytic results are
correct as reported, there are still some very
difficultchoices to be made, choicesthat
eventually must be faced by Americans act-
ing through their political institutions or by re-
cording their consumer preferences in markets.
The research, at best, provides only somewhat
better information for making these choices.
It can hardly be overstressed, moreover, how
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Figure 1-4
Costs and Regional Effectiveness
Net annual policy implementation
cost (million dollars)
Auto standards with large —
after 6 years of implementation
Auto standards with small cars• —
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Figure 1-5
Costs and Local Effectiveness
Net annual policy implementation
coat (million dollars)
120 — Auto standards with large —
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Local effectiveness (per cent CO reduction in Boston Proper)imperfect theinformationfor making these
choices remains. The required research is obvi-
ously well beyond the resources, intellectual or
financial, of an organization such as the Bureau.
Energy and environmental issues are prime
illustrations of problems that need the skills and
disciplines of many different professions, and
the fundamental issues involved are at least as
much medical and technological as they are
economic in character.
Although recognizing the inherent limitations
of purely economic analyses in these matters,
the Bureau will nevertheless continue to do as
much as its resources permit in developing the
requisite knowledge for better evaluating these
issues In the future. That future, incidentally,
should be quite long-lived, since these issues
should be with us for some while to come. The
form and content, however, may change dras-
tically—for example, perhaps the world really
will be awash with oil within two to five years, as
some predict—but the fundamentals should not
change much regardless of where the immedi-
ate policy emphasis is placed. The research ob-
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jective, accordingly, should be to improve our
knowledge of those fundamentals.
In this area, as in so many others, the need
is for systematic and factually objective analyses
to inform public.decisions. Meeting these needs
is very much in Bureau tradition. In the introduc-
tion to this report we cited several studies that
were relevant to the particular problems created
by the "Energy Crises of 1974." We could have
provided other examples from several other
areas in which the Bureau is involved and has
had a long interest, such as public finance,
education or human capital studies, law and
economics, health and medical care, or urban
problems (such as housing abandonment and
allowance schemes). In all these efforts the rele-
vance of Bureau research may not always have
been immediately evident, as it has often been
quite basic in character. Nevertheless, in most
instances this basic research has, in time, led to
analyses potentially useful to evaluating public
policies and problems—even when the exact
identity or character of those problems has not
been fully anticipated.INFLATION ACCOUNTING: ISSUES FOR RESEARCH
SOLOMON FABRICANT
Efforts to measure labor income free of the
effects of changes in the prices paid by workers
have a long history. Indexes of food prices at re-
tail became available in the United States around
1900. Comparison of changes in wages and
salaries with changes in the important food com-
ponent of the cost of living promptly.followed. A
more comprehensive measure of change in con-
sumer price levels, covering also nonfood items,
was demanded and became available during the
great inflation associated with World War I. This
consumer price index, applicable to urban wage
earners and clerical workers, has been available
on a regular basis ever since, and it has been
gradually improved in coverage and accuracy.
Indexes of wage and salary income are now as
a matter of course accompanied by this index of
consumer prices and attention is paid no less to
real than to money labor income in discussions
of the changing economic status of labor. In a
word, "deflated" wages and salaries are a com-
monplace.
Systematic allowance for change in prices
paid when assessing the economic well-being
of farmers came later, in the 1930s, when the
"parity" idea was introduced and implemented
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Like labor
income, farm income—the return from capital
investment and 'entrepreneurship," as well as
labor—is now regularly reported in constant as
well as current dollars.
In the case of nonfarm property income, defla-
tion to take account of change in the purchasing
power of money has lagged to a surprising—and
to many people, a disturbing—extent. Corporate
reports on profits earned during the year or
quarter, whether made to stockholders, tax col-
lectors,publicutility commissions, "cost of
living councils," or the public at large, are calcu-
lated on the basis of "generally accepted ac-
counting principles." In particular, the dollar is
assumed to be a stable unit of measurement.
Virtually no report, therefore, makes any allow-
ance for change in the general price level. Dur-
ing a period of inflation, reported increases in
10
profits inevitably exceed increasesin"real"
profits.
Even the information on profits that is cur-
rently prepared by economists and statisticians
for use in following the current economic situa-
tion is deficient in this regard. The first appear-
ance of a deflated corporate profit series in the
monthly Business Conditions Digest and other
publications of the Department of Commerce
occurred only a couple of years ago. No deflated
corporate profit series yet appears in Economic
Indicators, prepared by the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers for the Joint Committee of the
Congress. This monthly periodical, distributed
to all members of and presumably
widely used by them, publishes deflated income
series only for labor and farmers. Such compo-
nents of property income as dividends, interest,
and rents are shown, both in BCD and Economic
Indicators, deflated not separately but only in
combination (along with labor and farm income)
in the aggregate of personal income.
The overstatement of increases in business
profits.—or understatement of decreases—has
worried thoughtful citizens. They are concerned
about the implications of this overstatement for
business decisions generally, investment in par-
ticular, and taxation, price and wage controls,
and economic forecasting. And this has led
some of them to suggest the desirability of a
study of "inflation accounting" by the National
Bureau.
This concern has, of course, been intensified
by the very rapid inflation that the American
economy has been experiencing in recent years.
The failure of conventional accounting practice
to deal adequately with changing price levels is
an old worry, however. Twenty-five years ago
George May and Percival Brundage organized a
"Study Group on Business Income." Ten years
ago the Accounting Research Division of the
American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants made another study of the question. Five
years ago the Accounting Principles Board of
the AICPA issued its 'Statement No. 3" recom-mending —but not requiring—supplementary
statements disclosing the effects of changes in
the general price level on the financial account-
ing measurements. Yet these studies and state-
ments have had virtually no effect on current ac-
counting practice.
Only very recently have there been any signs
that the accounting profession as a whole may
finally be coming to recognize the need to allow
for changes in the general price level, in busi-
ness accounts, and to do something about it.
Just a few weeks ago the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, the successor to the Account-
ing Principles Board, held a public hearing on
the issues involved. It is possible—perhaps even
moderately probable—that the Board willre-
quire supplements, to the usual financial state-
ments of widely held corporations, that allow in
one way or other for the decline in the purchas-
ing power of the money used as the unit in busi-
ness accounts. A similar discussion going on in
Britain may be closer to affecting accounting
practice. In a few countries—not many—some
sort of adjustment for changes in the price level
is already in fairly general use, as a recent com-
pilation by Price Waterhouse indicates.
Many difficult problems arise when one at-
tempts to correct financial statements for infla-
tion. The BCD's simple'deflation of the reported
profit series is, no doubt, a major step toward
recognizing changes in the value of money. The
rise in corporate profits before tax between 1966
and 1973,for example, reportedincurrent
prices as 40 per cent, is under 10 per cent when
measured in constant prices. But how thor-
oughly this deflation corrects for reduction in the
value of the dollar is a matter of considerable
controversy. The BCD deflated series is derived
simply by dividing profits, as accountants calcu-
late them, by the GNP implicit price deflator.
Three groups of questions arise about the valid-
ity and accuracy of the result. One concerns the
current dollar profit figure, reported iii the usual
corporate income account or profit and loss
statement, that is deflated. Another concerhs the
deflator. And a third concerns the purchasing
power gains or losses, realized or not, on mone-
tary and nonmonetary assets andliabilities
when the value of money changes—gains or
losses not covered in the deflation of the re-
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ported profit series.
Reported profits, such as are shown in annual
or quarterly reports and mentioned in the daily
press, are not good measures even of profits
expressed in current prices. The reason is well
known to economists and accountants. Certain
important elements of current cost are calculated
in the prices paid in earlier periods, not in cur-
rent prices. When price levels are moving up,
original cost prices may be significantly below
the prices of the current period, the period for
which profits are being measured.
One such element of cost is that of with-
drawals from inventory of material, componeflts,
goods in process, and the like, that were used in
producing the goods or services sold during the
year or quarter. With the so-called "last-in-first-
out" method of costing inventory withdrawals,
the charge to current operations is at something
reasonably close to current prices. But LIFO is
in fact used only to a limited extent in calculating
corporate profits. When prices are rising rapidly,
the under-estimation of the cost of withdrawals
from inventory may be large. In 1973 this cost
may have been understated, to cite a round
number, by some $15 billion.
Similarly,depreciationandobsolescence
changes are generally based on the prices pre-
vailinginearlier years—indeed, many more
years earlier, as a rule, than withdrawals from
inventory. Yet no effort is made by accountants,
when calculating business profits, to substitute
for the original cost of plant and equipment the
current replacement cost, or, alternatively, the
original cost adjusted for change in the general
price level. The difference between original and
current cost of capital equipment used up in any
year may be greater or less than the difference in
the case of inventory withdrawals; it depends on
the course of the price level up to that year. In
1973,it so happened, depreciation and obso-
lescence charged at original cost understated
the charge at current cost also by around $15
billion.
In the national income and outlay accounts
prepared by the Department of Commerce, it
should be noted, the cost of withdrawals from
inventory is adjusted (although only approxi-
mately) to the current price level by means of the
department's "inventory valuation adjustment."However, even in the national accounts no ad-
justment is yet made for the fact that under cur-
rent accounting practice depreciation and obso-
lescence are charged at less than current cost.
Returning to the profits reported in corporate
financial statements, if the estimates mentioned
are near the mark we must conclude that the use
of original cost in determining charges for inven-
tory withdrawals and depreciation and obsoles-
cence meant that 1973 profits before income
tax, reported as $1 18 billion, were overstated by
as much as a third. Furthermore, the degree of
overstatement of profits in 1973, measured in
1973 prices, was greater than the degree of
overstatement of profits in 1972, measured in
1972 prices. The deflation procedure followed
in BCD to put profits in all years on the same
price basis (that of 1958) does not correct this
upward bias in the rate of change of profits.
Conventionally measured profits may suffer
also from biases in the opposite direction—
biases that depress rather than overstate both
the levels and the rates of change of profits.
These biases could serve to offset—whether
more or less is unclear—the bias in calculating
depreciation and obsolescence costs that has
just been discussed. If sufficiently strong, the
downward bias could even provide some offset
to the bias that results from calculating inventory
withdrawals at original cost, although this offset
could hardly be important in years when inflation
is very rapid. In the memorandum sent to the
Board in preparation for the present discussion,
a note by John Meyer drew attention to these
offsets.
One such offset is provided by accelerated
depreciation, which the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice has permitted in recent decades. Speeding
up the deduction for depreciation and obsoles-
cence reduces the lag between the time when
capital goods are acquired and the time when
depreciation is charged, and thus also reduces
the difference between original and replacement
cost. It should be stressed, however, that accel-
erated depreciation does not make it possible to
recoup more than the original cost. The differ-
ence can only be reduced, not eliminated. Thus,
also, accelerated depreciation serves to elimi-
nate some of the profits that reflect merely a
rise in the general price level (profits on which
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corporate income taxes would otherwise have
to be paid) but does not eliminate all the inflation
profits or taxes paid on these profits. Nor is the
acceleration geared to the rate, or to changes in
the rate, of inflation. As a result, particular year-
to-year changes in reported profits, and in the
corporate taxes paid on them, may stillbe
distorted.
A more subtle and perhaps more powerful off-
set mentioned by Meyer results from technologi-
cal change. This tends to reduce the cost of
maintaining the capacity of capital equipment
to produce a given volume of output below the
amount of depreciation charged. In addition, he
mentions growth in the capital stock, which also
serves to make current depreciation charges
higher than the amount needed to maintain cur-
rent capacity. These ideas, developed in studies
by Evsey Domar and Robert Eisner, were con-
sidered (but only briefly) in one of the papers
stemming'from the National Bureau study of in-
flation. The issue, as stated there, is whether
technological change and capital growth do in
fact offset the underpricing of depreciation and
obsolescenceinthe calculation of business
profits,if depreciation and obsolescence are
viewed as measuring reduction in the private
value of plant and equipment rather than reduc-
tion in the capacity of plant and equipment to
produce. The issue involves a difference be-
tween two points of view, the social and the pri-
vate. The issue merits more attention than it has
received. It would certainly deserve a thorough
airing in any study of inflation accounting on
which the National Bureau might embark.
The second group of questions concerns the
deflator used to convert business profits in cur-
rent prices to profits in constant prices.
One issue here is what index to use in deflat-
ing profits. If a single index is to be used for all
companies, should it be the GNP implicit price
deflator used in BCD or some alternative to it?
Alternatives sometimes suggested are the im-
plicit price deflator for private GNP, the "fixed
weighted price index" for gross private product,
the consumer price index, the all-commodity
wholesale price index, and the industrial-com-
modity wholesale price index. Most of these in-
dexes differ significantly over long as wellas
short periods.Another issue is whether a single deflator
should be used for all companies, or deflators
be tailored to the particular situation of each
company. In the case of wages and clerical sala-
ries, the common deflator used is the national
consumer price index, which reflects change in
the average level of prices paid by all those in
urban areas receiving this kind of labor income.
Itis known, however, that consumer price in-
dexes in parts of the country do not move exactly
parallel to the national average. Nor isit likely
that consumer price indexes applicable to work-
ers at different income levels even in the same
city would be identical—were such indexes
available. The question has usually been skirted,
presumably on the ground that the differences
are not large. Now, however,itis attracting
attention because of the plans of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to broaden the coverage of its
price index.
A similar question arises in the case of profits.
Companies differ considerably with regard to the
goods and services on which their profits are
expended—by stockholderswiththeirdivi-
dends1 and by the company itself with the money
it retains to replace and enlarge inventory and
capital goods as well as for other purposes.
These differences among companies inthe
composition of expenditures must be far wider
than among workers. The range is from the
small, specialized firm in one tiny corner of the
United States to the vast multinational conglom-
erate doing many different kinds of business in
many different countries, countriesin which
price levels change at diverse rates, and be-
tween which exchange rates may fluctuate
widely for this and for other reasons.
The use of deflators specific to each company
would, however, tend to eliminate some of the
profits gained, or losses incurred, by a company.
These are thedifferentialprofitsor losses
caused by changes in relative prices. The possi-
bility raises another complicated issue,Itin-
volves a difference between those who think of
the real profits of a company as measuring its
contribution to the real national income and
those who think of these profits as measuring
the company's share in the real national income.
Interestingly enough, the issue was raised in the
very first Income Conference held by the Na-
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tional Bureau almost forty years ago, as Well as
inlater conferences. There continues to be
much confusion—in the economic as well as
the accounting literature—about it, however. It
must suffice, here, to mention that the appropri-
ate treatment in financial statements of changes
in relative prices when making adjustments for
inflation raises another issue that would warrant
careful analysis in any study of inflation account-
ing undertaken by the National Bureau.
We turn, now, to the third set of questions
about the deflation of.profits. In addition to the
effects of inflation on the costing of inventory
withdrawals and depreciation and obsoles-
cence, economists and accountants naturally
think also of the effects of inflation on other items
in the income account and balance sheet. Be-
sides inventories and plant and equipment, the
balance sheet includes, for example, holdings of
such nondepreciable tangible assets as land.
These are carried on the books at original cost,
although their market value may have risen
radically. The rise in value is therefore not in-
cluded in the conventional measure of profits.
There are also monetary assets and liabilities,
the "real" values of which change in different
degree and in different directions when changes
occur in the purchasing power of the money in
which they are expressed. When these changes
in real value are ignored, as they conventionally
are, the measure of change in real net worth is
thereby improperly calculated. So, also, is the
calculation of real net income, realized or un-
realized, the magnitude of which must be con-
sistent with the change in net worth. Some of
these effects were considered ina National
Bureau studyby Raymond Goldsmith and
Robert Lipsey some years ago. That the issues
here also are difficult may be seen if one asks,
for example, whether preferred stock is a mone-
tary liability or an element of net worth. This par-
ticular question is one of many troubling the
FASB.
Still other sorts of questions arise besides
those on which I have been concentrating. These
go beyond mere financial accounting and con-
front us with far deeper issues. Included are the
effects of current accounting practices on busi-
ness decisions, on investment, on taxation, on
price-wage controls, and on economic forecast-ing—to repeat the questions that put the pres-
ent topic on the agenda of this meeting of our
Board. And there are many special questions—
concerning the public utilities and other regu-
lated industries, for example. It is hardly neces-
sary to spell out the bearing of conventional in-
come accounting on all these issues. Consider,
for instance, how income taxes are assessed.
What are the consequences, in an inflationary
era, for the distribution of the tax burden and of
income after taxes, and for the economic growth
of our country?
In fact, a host of issues arises when one con-
siders the effects of accounting under inflation.
Many appear under the broad heading of what
economists call "money illusion." Others come
to mind when one speculates on what the distri-
bution of national income would look like—dur-
ing the period of adjustment and afterward—
were escalator clauses to be introduced on a
comprehensive scale, as some economists have
been suggesting.
Even if a National Bureau study of inflation ac-
counting were to be strictly limited to the ac-
counting or measurement issues, we should con-
sider whether the study would not be better
ifit were broadened to cover not only account-
ing for profits but also for other types of income
under inflation.I have mentioned labor and farm
income. In connection with these, too, questions
arise—or should arise—about the measurement
of income even in current dollars, as well as the
best way to translate current-dollar income into
constant-dollar income. Although not so often
pointed out in popular discussions of wage or
farm income as they should be, to recipients of
these types of income, also, balance-sheet or
wealth effects of inflation are relevant. Questions
about capital gains, for example—real or nomi-
nal, realized or unrealized, and their bearing on
income and income-tax status—must trouble
citizens receiving various kinds of income and
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standing at various levels in the size distribution
of the nation's income. And so does the accu-
racy of the national consumer price index and
its appropriateness to their particular situation—
questions, as I have already mentioned, that are
now being raised more frequently than before,
as the BLS prepares to revise and extend its in-
dex. Indeed, even when limited to questions of
accounting, the study could be made broad
enough to embrace the measurement of the dis-
tribution of income not only by type but also by
size of income, under inflation.
There is a long tradition of study of private and
social accounts and measurements at the Na-
tional Bureau. A few have already been cited. If
we think back to the 1930s, we can recall William
Paton's pioneer study of corporate profits as
shown by audit reports, and the classic studies
by Simon Kuznets and his associates, which in-
troduced the inventory and depreciation valua-
tion adjustment ideas to national income ac-
counting. To turn to the present, the National
Bureau's Annua' Report just submitted to the
Board lists, among others, studies under way by
Michael Gort on profit rates, by Philip Cagan and
others on the effects of inflation on financial mar-
kets and the rates of return to different kinds of
securities, by Robert Gordon on the prices of
durable goods, and by Robert Eisner on a system
of income accounts in which capital gains are in-
cluded. Some of these studies focus primarily on
measurement problems. But none of the others
can afford to ignore these problems.
The danger to avoid in any new study of infla-
tion accounting on which the Bureau may decide
to embark is that of trying to cover too much. But
any study limited enough to be feasible would be
better, and its objectives less subject to mis-
understanding, if it were planned and carried out
with the broad contextIhave tried to sketch
here kept firmly in mind.